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Abstract 
 
We apply quintile regression methodology to player pay and performance data from the 
1985-86 to 2005-06 seasons of the National Basketball Association (NBA).  In addition 
to confirming a finding from Hakes and Turner (2007) of systematic bias in pooled OLS 
regressions of career paths for salary and productivity, the quintile analysis presents two 
important results regarding NBA salary structure.  Unlike Major League Baseball (MLB), 
the highest ability veteran NBA players suffer salary suppression relative to the lesser-
talented players in their debut-year cohort, indicating rents have been transferred from the 
most able players to players of lesser abilities.  Also, while young NBA players in 
general suffer from salary suppression relative to free agents, as is well-reported in 
baseball, our regression results show that the highest-ability young players suffer the 
most salary suppression, and that the effects of the rookie salary cap in the 1995 NBA 
Collective Bargaining Agreement depressed salaries for young players of all ability 
levels.   
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 I. Introduction 
 Researchers wishing to analyze labor market issues such as empirical 
relationships between pay and performance have tended to gravitate toward data taken 
from professional baseball.  This emphasis on professional baseball in the literature is not 
accidental - the discrete nature of the play of baseball and the detailed individual 
productivity statistics recorded make it a natural choice.1  Production in professional 
basketball is less easily separable, which complicates, but does not prevent, the task of 
performing informative analysis.  In particular, the recent history of collective bargaining 
in the National Basketball Association (NBA) will allow us to conduct an innovative 
exploration of the importance of negotiating leverage on pay-performance ratios in two 
dimensions. 
Hakes and Turner (2007), henceforth HT, analyzed the relationship between pay 
and performance in Major League Baseball along career paths as a representative player 
with a given peak ability entered the league, aged, and eventually retired from play.  That 
paper utilized quintile analysis to examine how productivity patterns vary between 
cohorts of ability and how well the labor markets in MLB accommodated those variations 
in salary levels.  One key result was that pooling players of all abilities in OLS time path 
regressions of productivity (or pay) leads to biased coefficients on age (or experience) 
and its quadratic, resulting in a “flatter” time profile than is actually the case.  The results 
also showed that players of all ability levels receive approximately their marginal 
                                                 
1 Previous work includes such topics as salary discrimination and the salary effects of arbitration and free 
agency, among other topics.  The majority of this research stems from the seminal work of Scully (1974).  
Kahn (1991) summarized the early racial discrimination literature, which has since expanded to include 
analyses of coaching discrimination in MLB (Singell [1991]), the NFL (Madden [2004]), and the NBA 
(Humphreys [2000], Kahn [2006]).  Marburger (1994, 2004) looks at final offer arbitration in MLB, while 
Zimbalist (1992), Kahn (1993), Vrooman (1996) and Miller (2000), among many others, look at the salary 
effects of free agency in baseball.     
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products after becoming free agents.  However, HT provided evidence of dramatic salary 
suppression for players of all ability levels before they become free agents, with salary 
suppression most severe for players of the lowest ability.   
In this paper, we adapt the quintile analysis methodology outlined in HT to 
examine the paths of pay and performance for NBA players.  Our goals in doing so are 
threefold.  First, we hope to illustrate the generality across professional team sports of the 
statistical effect that pooling players of all abilities leads to biased OLS regression 
coefficients.2  Secondly, the differences in collective bargaining agreements and other 
institutional details between leagues have tended to leave veteran NBA players with less 
freedom to contract than their MLB counterparts.  Quintile analysis allows us to 
determine whether the effects of that disparity are experienced uniformly by all NBA 
players, or are disproportionately borne by more talented (or less talented) players. The 
third goal of this paper is to compare the extent of salary suppression for younger players 
of different ability levels in NBA, and see how salary suppression patterns were affected 
by the changes made in the 1995 collective bargaining agreement.   
In order to proceed, we require a performance metric.  As alluded to above, the 
research on performance measures in basketball is less settled than that of the baseball 
literature.  The nature of team play in basketball allows teams to channel the ball to 
players who specialize in scoring.  While recent additions to the literature, such as the 
work by Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) have sought other methods to correctly weight 
individual contributions to team performance that do not directly involve scoring, we 
                                                 
2 We chose basketball (and previously baseball) because these are the professional sports that lend 
themselves most readily to the measurement of individual components of on-the-field performance.     
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have chosen to use the IBM Award methodology.3  We further discuss the reasons for 
this choice in Section III.   
 The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section II, we briefly outline the 
econometric problems involved in career path estimations and the quintile analysis 
technique we will use to address those problems.4  Section III discusses the data used.  
Section IV looks at player productivity and Section V examines salary, each doing so 
over the span of the career of a representative player.  Section VI relates pay to 
performance, while Section VII summarizes our findings and identifies related topics that 
would benefit from further research. 
 II.  Variation of Individual Characteristics Over Time 
 II.A.  Career Paths in Productivity 
 Previous research has indicated that athletic performance peaks near 27 years of 
age, with only minor variation across sports.5  In a typical specification, ability would be 
modeled as a function of age and its quadratic: 
 Abilityi = α + β1 agei + β2 agei2 + εi     (1a)  
where α is the vertical intercept, and εi is a stochastic error.  A player’s career path in 
productivity, or “ability path” can be thought of as the locus of Abilityi level over the 
relevant range of ages, and can be discussed in terms of the parameters α, β1, and β2.   
                                                 
3 The IBM award formula is analogous to, but predates, the model presented in Oliver (2004).  We also 
examined our results using a slightly modified version of the Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) system.  
See section III.  
4 See Hakes and Turner (2007) for a more detailed exposition. 
5 See James (1982), Krohn (1983), Albert (1999), and Schulz et al. (1994) for estimation of production 
peaks.   
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 As our purpose in the following analysis will be to compare career paths in 
performance to career paths in salary, which, as the next subsection will explain, are best 
expressed as a function of experience, we will also consider the related equation: 
 Abilityi = α + β1 expi + β2 expi2 + εi     (1b)  
which differs only in the use of experience, exp, as the independent variable. 
 The typical practice in previous research on productivity estimation in sports is to 
pool all players when estimating equation (1).  With the exception of HT and Schulz et al. 
(1994), we know of no studies searching for or finding systematic differences in the 
ability paths of players of different ability levels.6   
  Pooled regressions implicitly assume that the productivity dynamics for all 
players are identical.  Star players and marginal players in this model would peak at the 
same age, develop at the same rate, and have their skills deteriorate at the same rate 
during their careers. If this assumption is incorrect, the model is misspecified per se.  But 
even if the productivity dynamics for all players are identical, pooled empirical 
estimation would still result in biased coefficients, as marginal players will be present in 
prime-age samples, but absent from early- and late-age samples (due to their sub-
marginal ability at those ages)  The observational bias increases in magnitude as the 
distance (in years) from the peak age increases.7  The theoretical effect is illustrated in 
Figure 1, and shows that an estimated regression line from pooled player data will tend to 
underestimate the magnitudes of the β1 and β2 terms in Equation (1a).  To the extent that 
                                                 
6 Krautman (1993) did acknowledge the estimation problems posed by inherently different ability levels, 
but maintained the traditional methodology.   
7 On the left-hand side of the relevant range of ages this effect might be somewhat lessened by entry 
barriers ostensibly designed to keep players out of the league until they have attended college.  Though the 
magnitude of the mismeasurement would be reduced as a result, the bias from aging players in the right tail 
would persist. 
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selection into the league is based upon reaching a threshold level of ability (although this 
is less often the case in basketball as in Major League Baseball), the bias arising from 
end-of-career statistics would be even more pronounced in Equation (1b). 
  II.B.  Career paths in salary 
 Estimation of player pay has followed a substantially different methodology than 
that used for player performance, with most models estimating salaries directly as a 
function of productivity or ability. For the purpose of comparing the dynamics of career 
paths, however, we establish time paths for individual player salaries as a function of 
experience (expi).  Therefore we will formulate an empirical equation with a structure 
similar to the ability equation above.   
  ln(salary)i = α + β1 expi + β2 expi2 + γ’Posi + εi   (2) 
Equation (2) has a right hand side analogous to the salary model, although it also 
includes a vector of control variables indicating player i’s position and it uses the natural 
logarithm of salary as the dependent variable to preserve normality of the residual terms.  
In comparison with traditional salary models, this model is extremely sparse.  It lacks not 
only the normal control variables for negotiating freedom, market size, player awards, 
etc., but also the variable which typically is the primary regressor – ability.8   
The use of experience rather than age is necessitated by the nature of collective 
bargaining agreements.  Aside from ability, the most important predictor of player salary 
is freedom to contract, which is defined in the league agreements as a function of playing 
experience.  Consequently, our salary fits are far more efficient using experience.  While 
we begin our discussion in Section III of ability paths using age in order to illustrate our 
                                                 
8 The division of players into ability quintiles allows a crude control for ability.  We include indicator 
variables for position as a concession to identifying player MRP. 
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premise of replacement level observation bias, we will subsequently estimate using years 
of experience in order to allow comparisons between pay and performance using a 
common time dimension.9   
II.C. Correcting for observational bias 
 If we were to estimate Equation (2) using a pool of all players, it would be 
subject to the observational bias we described in section II.A.   The approach we use to 
reduce this bias is to divide our sample of players into ability cohorts that are more 
homogeneous than the pooled sample.  As the variation in ability is reduced within each 
cohort, the resulting estimates are subject to less bias caused by differences in the age at 
which the players rose above or fell below replacement level.   
Two sources of potential difficulty when estimating Equation (2) are readily 
apparent.  First, on the left hand tail of the experience distribution, reserve clauses and 
other restrictions on negotiating freedom for inexperienced players would be expected to 
lead to depressed salaries during the early stages of player careers.  Separate regressions 
for free agents and players under restricted bargaining may present significant 
improvements in the accuracy of estimates.10  Second, whereas player ability has been 
empirically determined to fade as a player ages past his peak, empirical evidence of 
player salaries falling as they age has not been as well documented.  Separating samples 
of young players and veterans allows us to verify that the quadratic term is significant 
                                                 
9 As could be predicted, the effect of the switch from age to experience in productivity equation (1) is that 
higher-ability players peak later in their careers, as they debut at younger ages, allowing more playing time 
prior to their peak age. 
10 Fort (1992) estimated separate parabolic arcs for salary trends of players of below mean and above mean 
age.  Although our differing arcs “hinge” at the point of free agent eligibility rather than mean age, the 
econometric objective is the same. 
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because of both early career and late career effects rather than one or the other.11  Failure 
to find late career salary declines could plausibly be explained by star players refusing to 
accept salary cuts as their contracts come up for renewal after a performance decline, 
leading to observational selection with a short lag, or because the marginal revenue 
product (MRP) of star players does not decline as ability does.12  Upon observing the data 
we will assess the appropriateness of the functional form of equation (2). 
III. Data 
As salary data is only available for the years 1985-86 to 2005-06, we set that as 
our sample period.  Salary data was obtained from Patricia Bender’s website.13  
Individual performance data is available on a player-season basis from 
www.basketballreference.com, and includes all the component statistics necessary to 
calculate the productivity measures we use.   
Because production is less separable than in baseball, the measurement of the 
performance of basketball players is less settled in the literature.  We considered two 
possible NBA performance metrics.  The first, which we ultimately selected, was the 
IBM Award formula (hereafter referred to as IBM Score). It is calculated with the 
formula: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−++++−
+−−++++−=
ttotpftblktstltasttrebtfgatpts
teamwinstopfblkstlastrebfgaptsScoreIBM )*10(*250  
                                                 
11 One exception to this has been Horowitz and Zappe (1998), who concluded that, for baseball players, pay 
erodes after 9 years of play and that the effect was much smaller for former-star players. 
12 The latter possibility allows for veteran fan favorites and stars that either retain their popularity and 
drawing power through the end of their careers, or watch their fame decline more slowly than their fading 
skills, as was the case with the end-of-career versions of Cal Ripken Jr., Willie Mays, or Michael Jordan.  
Although the discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, there is also a large literature in personnel 
economics that studies reasons why salaries may vary from MRP under competition.  Common theories of 
this sort include efficiency wages to combat shirking and incentives for career contracting. 
13 The URL is http://www.nationwide.net/~patricia/.  Player salary information is not available for the 
1986-87 and 1989-90 seasons. 
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where pts, fga, reb, ast, stl, blk, pf, and to represent points scored, field goal attempts, 
rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, personal fouls, and turnovers, respectively, for each 
player.  The denominator contains the value of the statistic for the team as a whole.  One 
could think of IBM Score as having two components: the first is each individual player’s 
share of his team’s measurable performance, each statistic receiving a positive or 
negative weight of unity.  The second is a team quality effect that is common to players 
on a team.   
 The other performance measure considered was a slightly modified version of 
Winscore, outlined in Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006).14  We take no stand here on 
which measure is best, nor do we to wish to participate in the literature concerning the 
optimal weight for each statistic.  We do note the IBM Score measure gives more weight 
to an assist and a block than does winscore, while Winscore makes an adjustment for free 
throw attempts and has a smaller penalty for personal fouls.  IBM Score measure has a 
direct measure of team performance, while Winscore does not.  Ultimately, we selected 
IBM Score because we are uncomfortable with the fact that, on average, centers have 
considerably larger measured performance then guards and forwards using Winscore, and 
because the distribution of Winscore is more skewed than the distribution of IBM Score.15  
We also find that IBM Score is slightly more correlated with log salary than is winscore.16  
                                                 
14 The definition of Winscore is: ftatopfblkstlastrebfgaptsWinscore 212121 −−−++++−= . 
15 The average measures of Winscore across our sample of players (for which we have both salaries and 
performance measures) are 316.5, 441.1, and 488.1, for guards, forwards, and centers respectively.  Using 
IBM Score, the means are 48.68, 51.43, and 52.77, respectively.  While we do find that centers, on average, 
earn higher salaries than guards and forwards, the size of the salary gap is not as large as the size of the 
performance gap using the winscore metric.  See Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) for an argument that 
this is evidence of underpayment of centers. 
     While ultimately our measures of performance are indexed by position, the fact remains that on a 
basketball court, positions are fluid and therefore, the distinction between positions can be arbitrary.  A 
player like Tim Duncan could arguably be classified as either a forward or a center.  Given the large gap in 
mean performance levels of centers and forwards using winscore, the indexed performance we 
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 IBM Score varies across time and across position.  Centers, on average, have IBM 
Score values roughly 8 percent higher than guards, while the gap between the year with 
the highest average IBM Score and the year with the lowest is roughly 10 percent.  We 
have therefore indexed IBM Score to correct for between-year and between-position 
variation.     
Players were placed in ability quintiles based on their single best season as 
measured by indexed IBM score, so that each quintile represented equal numbers of 
player-seasons.17,18  We include earlier seasons for players who were active prior to 1985 
when identifying peak seasons.  We also exclude players who are active in 2005-06 and 
younger than 29 years old, as these players may not be old enough to have reached their 
peak season.  Means are reported in Table 1. 
IV.  Career productivity paths 
IV.A.   Productivity paths with respect to Age 
We will estimate player development and deterioration first by age, and later by 
years of experience.  Conditioning with respect to age is the intuitive way to analyze the 
validity of the implicitly assumed characteristics of career performance paths as 
presented in Section II.A. and to observe selection effects early and late in careers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
subsequently calculate could be meaningfully different depending on positional classification.  Use of the 
IBM Score reduces, but does not eliminate, the impacts of positional assignments listed in the 
baseketballreference.com database.     
16 We have repeated our analysis using winscore as our performance measure, and using winscore per 
minute played. The simple correlation between the quintile assigned by using IBM Score and the quintile 
assigned by using winscore is 0.92, and the productivity trends the two methods produce are qualitatively 
very similar.  See also Kubatko et al. (2007) for a discussion of the tradeoffs between the models. 
17 Those familiar with the methodology used by HT may recall that players were assigned to ability 
quintiles by their third best season.  Because the IBM Score measures player performances as a proportion 
of team production, the problem of positive outliers from injury-shortened seasons or partial-season players 
is reduced.  Therefore using the third best season, as was done in HT, is not necessary.     
18 The cutoff levels of indexed IBM Score are 0.887, 1.100, 1.304, and 1.541.   The use of player-seasons as 
the unit of measure results in fewer players being assigned to the top quintile (101 players) than to the 
bottom quintile (339 players).   
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However, ability changes with respect to experience are necessary to make comparisons 
to salary. In Equation (1a), each player-season is weighted by minutes played to avoid 
bias caused by part-time players, especially in the extreme tails of the age distribution.   
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results from three model specifications that allow  
testing of the implicitly assumed characteristics of career performance paths.  Under 
pooled regressions, these would be that -- regardless of relative ability level -- players 
develop at the same rate with respect to age, peak at the same age, and deteriorate at the 
same rate after they peak.  That is, the only difference between players in Equation (1a) is 
α, the intercept term.  Model 1 naively pools all player seasons without any controls for 
ability quintile.  Model 2 adds differential intercept terms for each ability quintile to the 
Model 1 configuration, thus estimating Equation (1a).  The associated Chow F-statistic 
shows that the improved explanatory power of the model, from 0.8% to 55.4% percent of 
the variation in ability, is statistically significant.  Model 3 tests whether adding 
differential slope terms to Model 2, which allows players of different relative abilities to 
develop and decline at varying rates, further improves the fit.  The F-statistic 2.33 
confirms that the increase in goodness-of-fit is statistically significant.  The rejection of 
the null hypotheses in Model 2 and Model 3 confirms that pooling of the ability quintiles 
is inappropriate.   
Panel B of Table 2 reports the coefficients implied by Model 3 for each ability 
quintile, as well as the estimated age at which performance peaks.  The differential slope 
terms indicate that the rate of development and the rate of deterioration in measured 
performance are nearly identical for players in quintiles four and five, while the profiles 
are considerably flatter for lower ability players.  It is the star basketball players 
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experience considerably more within-career variation.  The results do not show 
significantly different peak ages for NBA players.  However, there is some additional 
difficulty in interpreting ability peaks, as measured performance includes not only “pure” 
playing ability, but also playing time and the role played on the team.19 
The bottom row in Panel B of Table 2 returns to the concept of observational bias, 
displaying the coefficients and peak age estimated in the pooled regression.  The 
coefficient estimates for age and its quadratic have lower magnitudes in the pooled 
regression than in all but the lowest quintile regression.  We see that the effect of the 
biased slope coefficients is that the estimated peak age is biased upward by 2.8 years 
above the median peak age of the constituent quintiles, and above the point estimate for 
any one of them. 
Figure 2 illustrates the fitted productivity paths for the five quintiles and the 
flatter regression line for the pooled sample in the context of the contingent mean values 
of indexed IBM Score by age.  Each fitted regression line is discontinued at the point 
when there are fewer than ten players remaining in the sub-sample at that age level.  The 
source of the truncation in the left tail of the age distribution here can clearly be attributed 
to players apprenticing in college basketball programs.  As a result of the truncation, the 
top quintile of players is already quite accomplished at the time of their NBA debut, but 
the high level of ability of upper quintile players as they debut suggests star players reach 
replacement level while younger.  
                                                 
19 A player who is their team’s primary scoring option will have a measure of performance that closely 
matches his best possible performance.  The rapid increase in development for high ability players early in 
their careers may in fact be a period in which the player is transitioning from being a secondary scoring 
option (whose observed performance is somewhat suppressed in favor of the go-to scorer) to the team’s 
primary scoring option. 
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Indeed, on average, players in quintile five have a higher average indexed IBM 
score during their rookie seasons than quintile four players will have during their career 
peak year.  This result is true for each lower corresponding quintile as well.  In the right 
tail of the age distribution, quintile five players retire before their ability deteriorates to 
the level of quintile four players.  The mid-quintile players, however, tend to hold on 
relatively longer, possibly because their lower career earnings affect their preferences for 
consumption-leisure tradeoffs.   
IV.B.  Productivity Paths with respect to Experience 
To anticipate the comparison of productivity to salaries in section V, we fit 
Equation (1b) to the data.  Expanding upon the notion in footnote 9, the switch from age 
to experience can be thought of as a relative rightward shift of the higher quintile 
productivity paths in Figure 1.  We again weight each player-season observation by the 
number of minutes played and index to control for seasonal and positional variation in 
IBM Score. The coefficients are reported in Table 3.  Model 1 pools all players, Model 2 
adds differential intercepts for each quintile, and Model 3 adds differential coefficients 
for age and its quadratic.   
  Unlike the age models in Table 2 where the intercept had no economic 
interpretation, the intercepts in Panel B of Table 3 estimate the mean indexed IBM Score 
for players in that quintile at the time of their debut.  The Chow test for Model 2 of Panel 
A serves to confirm what we saw in Figure 2, that higher quintile players have higher 
ability (statistically significant differential intercepts) as they enter the league.   
 Panel B of Table 3 presents the fitted equations for each quintile and the 
estimated experience level at which performance peaks.  The results clearly show that the 
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higher ability quintiles are exhibiting more curvature from within-career variation and 
have a higher initial slope in the pre-peak years of experience, as we saw in the age 
regressions of Table 2.  The F-statistic of 3.61 for Model 3 in Panel A confirms the 
increase in fit from allowing differential slope and quadratic coefficients is statistically 
significant.    
The regressions estimate peak performance at 4 years of experience for quintiles 
two and three, 4.4 years of experience for quintile four, and 5.9 years of experience for 
quintile five.  Switching from using age to using experience causes the gap between peak 
experience levels across quintiles to increase slightly as some high ability players avoid 
the observational truncation by debuting young, sliding the upper quintile functions to the 
right in relative terms.  The pooled regression line peaks too late, with the more than 
three year distortion representing a larger bias that appeared in the analysis by age.  
Figure 3 illustrates the fitted productivity paths for the five quintiles and the 
pooled sample by experience.  Figure 3 shows that high ability players can be identified 
quite early in their career, and these players continue to show high ability until quite late 
in their careers.  While it is true that older players’ abilities do fade, as a general rule they 
retire before they fall into mediocrity, and they are still having very productive years after 
nearly all the quintile 1 players in their “rookie class” have retired.  Looking at the data in 
Figure 3, the performance level of players in the n-th quintile remains above the peak of 
the (n-1)th quintile until roughly 10 years of experience.20   
V.  Career Salary Paths 
                                                 
20 Although it is not picked up in the regressions, the plotted data points representing quintile mean indexed 
IBM score for a given level of experience display a plateau that appears between roughly 4 and 8 years of 
experience for the upper quintiles of ability. A similar pattern appears in the age plots of productivity in 
Figure 2. 
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Table 4 shows annual arithmetic mean and geometric mean salaries in the NBA 
for each season from 1985-86 to 2005-06.  Arithmetic means have increased from about 
$464,000 to over $5.5 million, while geometric means have increased from about 
$346,000 to roughly $3.8 million.  Although the time trends in both sports are towards 
rapidly increasing salaries, the data show sharp increases between the 1995-96 and 1996-
97 seasons and between the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 seasons. 
As was discussed in Section II.B., the lack of freedom to contract has consistently 
been shown to suppress individual player salaries.  A natural thought is to estimate 
Equation (2) separately for free-agents and non-free agents, so that for the former group 
we can compare pay and productivity without the dissimilarities introduced by 
monopsonistic rents.  In Major League Baseball this would be a straightforward task, as 
free agency rules have varied only slightly during the time period we are studying.  In 
basketball, however, the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) of 1995 and 1998 have 
resulted in significant changes in the institutional arrangements governing salaries.  
Therefore we have two tasks – to determine when a player becomes a free agent and to 
determine if there is a structural break occurs across time.   
The first issue to consider is when in a player’s career they achieve enhanced 
ability to negotiate.  For players who entered the league prior to 1995, the salary-
experience profile shows no discrete increase at any level of experience.21  However, the 
CBAs of 1995 and 1998 imposed a standardized rookie contract that makes it much 
clearer when players are free to negotiate with all teams.22  Based on the details of the 
                                                 
21 This is in part because the length of rookie contracts was not uniform across players, and also in part 
because of long-term contracts being offered before the initial contract had expired. 
22 The 1995 CBA set rookie contracts to be 3 years in length.  The 1998 CBA set rookie contracts to be 3 
years in length with a team option for the fourth year.  We therefore make our definition of free agents 
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1995 and 1998 CBAs, we define free-agent eligible players as those players with four or 
more years of experience.   
A major change that affected non-free agents was the imposition of the rookie 
scale in the 1995 CBA.  Salaries for those selected in the first round of the NBA Draft 
were determined by a published table, while second round picks were paid the league 
minimum salary.  As was evident in the raw data, non-free-agent players who entered the 
league after 1995 earn relatively less than players who entered the league before 1995 
across all ability quintiles.  Therefore, the imposition of the rookie scale in the 1995 (and 
its subsequent inclusion in the 1998 CBA) supports estimating equation (2) separately for 
non-free agent players, depending on whether they entered the league before or after 
1995.  
In addition, the contracting environment has changed meaningfully across time 
for players who are free-agent eligible.  Throughout the period examined, the NBA has 
operated under a binding salary cap of some fashion, so that even veteran players in this 
period could not simultaneously negotiate with all teams for an uncapped salary.  In the 
earlier years of our sample, the NBA operated under a “hard cap”.  Later, the so-called 
Larry Bird exception “softened” the cap, but only for the best players, and only for 
purposes of re-signing with their previous team.  An important change in the 1998 CBA 
is the imposition of an effective maximum salary in the 1998 CBA.23    
                                                                                                                                                 
conservative, selecting players with at least 4 year of experience.  While the four year cutoff for player who 
entered the league prior to 1995 is arbitrary, it is chosen to be consistent with the league rules as reflected 
in the 1995 and 1998 CBAs.   
23 We ultimately will construct an index of player salaries relative to the salaries of free agents.  In doing 
so, we will end up constructing an index that is relative to a group of players who have relatively more 
freedom to negotiate, but even this group does not consist of truly “free” agents in the sense that veteran 
MLB players that are free agents. 
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To control for inflation and other institutional changes, we index a player’s salary 
relative to the geometric mean salary of players who are free agent eligible in that season.  
Use of the geometric mean as the measure of central tendency mimics the traditional 
preference of log-salaries to dollar salaries in labor market regression analysis to 
counteract the right-skewness of the salary distribution.  As applying natural logarithms 
to a simple ratio index presents mathematical problems, we have adjusted the formula 
using a scaling technique to assist computation of a statistic that is log-normally 
distributed, as are the salaries themselves.24 
We therefore begin with Equation (2), add a differential intercept for those 
entering the league before 1995 (pre95i), and add interaction terms between pre95i and 
the Exp i and Exp i2 terms.  The result is:     
ln(salary)i = α + β1 expi + β2 expi2 + β3pre95i  + β4pre95i*expi2 
+ β5pre95i*expi2 +γ’Posi + εi      (3) 
We display the estimates of Equation (3) in Table 5, and display the predicted values in 
Figure 5.  Again, the quintile regressions provide information superior to that resulting 
from the pooled regression.  We see salary peak at nearly exactly 7 years of experience 
for all ability quintiles with the exception of the highest ability players, whose peak 
salary occurs at just over 8 years of experience.  However, due to the observational bias 
caused by the lengthier careers of higher ability players, the pooled regression line does 
not peak until over 10 years of experience, overstating the peak by at least two years.   
                                                 
24 To solve the mechanical problem of below-average salaries yielding negative ln(ratio) results, we 
adjusted to formula to represent percent salaries.  Thus, lnnsal )100ln(
ln
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+= gmsal
salary
, where gmsal is the league-
wide geometric mean salary for free agents.  The function calibrates the statistic so that a player with the 
geometric mean salary has an lnnsal of 1.00, a player with double the mean salary will have lnnsal of 1 + 
ln(2) / ln(100) = 1.151, and a player with half the mean salary will have lnnsal of 1 + ln(0.5) / ln(100) = 
0.849. 
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Another interesting feature apparent from Figure 4 is that the salary paths of 
players are flatter than the productivity paths.  This is especially true for players in the 
top two talent quintiles.  As a consequence, pay is depreciating much more slowly than 
performance, a point we revisit in the following section.  
VI.   Pay and Productivity 
Due to the multiple adjustments and instances of indexing we have applied to the 
raw data to assist our analysis of the age trends in performance and in pay, and the caveat 
of having no reference group that has unlimited ability to negotiate with all teams, it is 
unclear what the “efficient” ratio of our constructed estimators would be in an ideally 
functioning labor market.25  For this reason, our discussion of pay and performance will 
be of a relatively heuristic nature.  That said, we wish to place our research in the context 
of the existing literature. 
Previous attempts to compare player productivity to compensation have followed 
the seminal theoretical work of Scully (1974).  Using a two-stage model, team revenue is 
shown to be primarily determined by team wins, establishing that the production of wins 
is the player’s marginal physical product, and that the revenue accruing to the team from 
a player’s performance statistics determine his marginal revenue product.  Here, we 
change focus by comparing time paths of pay and performance with respect to changes in 
a mutual covariate, experience, the inclusion of control variables is not necessary.   
We follow HT and calculate a pay-to-productivity ratio by dividing the adjusted 
salary figure described in footnote 22 by the indexed IBM Score.  The raw ratios are 
                                                 
25 If one were to assume that the efficient salary for a player of position-specific mean ability is the 
geometric mean salary of all free agents, and that deviations of ability from the position-specific mean 
should be rewarded with log-linear increases in salary, then a ratio of 1.00 could be considered efficient.  It 
is not at all clear to us that either of those conditions should necessarily hold. 
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displayed in Figure 5.26  Throughout their careers, with the exception of the first year or 
two, all ability quintiles see a nearly uninterrupted increase in the pay to productivity 
ratio.  In the early portion of a player's career, this is because skill levels are increasing 
more slowly than increased ability to contract.  However, in the latter part of a player’s 
career, this is a consequence of salary decreasing at a slower rate then than rate of decline 
in productivity.  Salary peaks between 2.5 and 3.1 years after performance peaks.   
The most interesting result is that pay to productivity ratios are nested, but players 
in the lower ability quintiles receive pay that is larger relative to their productivity than 
players in the higher ability quintiles.  This is suggestive that both maximum salary 
amounts and minimum salaries are quite binding, and is consistent with Rosenbaum 
(2003), which showed rents being transferred from elite players to low- and mid-level 
talents.  Players who entered the NBA after 1995 have a meaningfully lower salary to 
performance ratio, a direct consequence of the rookie scale contracts.   
VII.  Summary of findings and future plans 
As in the earlier HT paper, we use quintile analysis to permit exploration for 
differing rates of skill development and deterioration for players of different levels of 
peak ability in each league, and comparison of the variation in a player’s ability across 
his career to the variation of talent within the league.  In both NBA and MLB, regressions 
using quintile analysis reduce the observational bias caused by careers of star players 
who enter the league before and/or remain in the league after lesser-able players reach 
replacement level.  The result is not merely an artifact of the MLB sample.  Beyond 
                                                 
26 Again, the interpretation here is more cumbersome due to the institutional details.  The ratio of pay to 
performance of a player is relative to that observed of players with more than four years of experience.  
Due to the maximum salary provision and salary cap, these players are likely paid less than their marginal 
revenue product.  The value 1.0 is less meaningful here than it is for MLB, where veterans are free to 
negotiate for their full marginal revenue product. 
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reducing the observational bias in the data, the quintile regression results show that 
higher ability basketball players develop faster than lower-peaking players, with the 
differences being more pronounced in the NBA than those found by HT for baseball.  In 
another contrast with the baseball results, basketball players do not reach their 
productivity peaks at significantly different ages, where MLB players in the top two 
quintiles appear to peak about two years later than players in the lowest three quintiles. 
Use of the quintile methodology along with the calculation of adjusted salary to 
indexed productivity ratios permit a suggestive examination of underpayment of players 
with reduced negotiating power due to league collective bargaining agreements.  As in 
previous literature, we find that salaries of young players are suppressed below those of 
similarly talented older peers.  In contrast to HT, which showed the relationship between 
salary and productivity is relatively stable and uniform across all quintiles of MLB 
players, particularly for veterans, pay-to-productivity ratios in basketball vary strongly by 
quintile.  The NBA data suggest that both salary caps and minimum salary levels are 
binding constraints that transfer rents from higher quintile players to lower quintile 
players.  Moreover, our regression results show that the rookie salary scale imposed with 
the 1995 Collective Bargaining Agreement increased owner rents.   
 Given the difficulties involved in the appropriate measurement of productivity in 
basketball, our conclusions should be viewed cautiously pending further exploration and 
verification using alternative methods.   If the results hold, the finding that salary 
inefficiencies exist in two dimensions in basketball -- both between high- and low-
experience players and between ability cohorts of veterans – leaves interesting public 
choice questions over how union priorities are formed prior to collective bargaining, and 
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of how much of the differing bargaining outcomes in baseball and basketball can be 
explained by the differing effects of aging upon productivity of athletes in these sports.  
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Table 1:  Summary statistics for National Basketball Association (NBA) analysis, overall 
and by talent quintile, 1985-2005. 
Variable q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 pooled 
IBM score 29.38 36.96 43.57 49.70 64.33 44.83 
Indexed IBM score 0.597 0.752 0.887 1.016 1.302 0.912 
age 26.16 27.61 28.17 28.64 29.16 27.95 
experience 3.326 4.941 5.788 6.322 7.196 5.519 
guard d.v. 0.379 0.421 0.394 0.488 0.367 0.410 
forward d.v. 0.417 0.401 0.403 0.397 0.436 0.411 
center d.v. 0.204 0.178 0.203 0.115 0.197 0.180 
year 1995.0 1995.0 1995.2 1995.1 1995.1 1995.1 
minutes 1166.7 1546.9 1831.8 2038.0 2290.8 1776.2 
points 408.40 599.76 760.65 844.73 1086.44 740.87 
rebounds 191.61 242.65 303.16 337.24 485.51 312.44 
assists 82.94 129.03 160.06 214.88 280.06 173.62 
steals 36.64 49.33 59.46 73.26 85.34 60.87 
blocks 22.05 29.47 38.44 40.93 58.48 37.92 
turnovers 66.18 91.45 109.02 123.98 161.55 110.55 
personal fouls 136.04 155.05 171.76 168.81 186.57 163.72 
field goal attempts 356.77 507.91 638.68 693.68 850.10 610.07 
field goals made 160.26 230.47 293.31 319.40 408.70 282.75 
free throw attempts 99.29 148.97 179.44 220.20 316.91 193.22 
free throws made 71.12 112.00 136.65 168.91 237.89 145.51 
three point attempts 48.49 76.21 104.60 104.91 91.43 85.20 
three points made 16.77 26.82 37.38 37.02 31.15 29.85 
salary (millions) 1.000 1.618 2.472 3.293 4.580 2.598 
ln(salary) 13.36 13.87 14.26 14.47 14.82 14.16 
indexed salary 0.561 0.895 1.281 1.639 2.327 1.343 
adj. salary (lnnsal) 0.754 0.863 0.944 0.994 1.068 0.925 
ratio of lnnsal/nibm 1.34 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.90 1.13 
N (player-seasons) 911 903 921 910 919 4564 
N (players) 339 162 132 114 101 848 
Note: Quintile sizes are not exactly equal because the career length of marginal players 
might force some player-seasons across percentile boundaries.
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Table 2:  Estimated indexed IBM Score, by age and ability quintile, 1985-2005. 
Panel A: Regression diagnostics 
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
-0.509** -1.763** -0.674 Intercept 
(0.249) (0.168) (0.654) 
0.107** 0.181** 0.093* Age 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.049) 
-0.002** -0.003** -0.002* Age2 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
Quintile d.v. No Yes Yes 
Quintile d.v. x age No No Yes 
Quintile d.v. x age2 No No Yes 
    
Observations 4564 4564 4564 
R2 0.008 0.554 0.556 
F-statistic (Chow)  1392.49** 2.33** 
* - Significant at 90% confidence level; ** - Significant at 99% confidence level 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Fitted equations and peaks, by quintile 
Quintile Intercept β1 (Age) β2 (Age2) Peak Age Peak iIBM 
1 -0.674 0.093 -0.002 28.3 0.647 
2 -0.876 0.127 -0.002 26.7 0.825 
3 -0.706 0.132 -0.003 25.7 0.991 
4 -1.544 0.202 -0.004 26.6 1.153 
5 -1.340 0.207 -0.004 27.2 1.475 
Pooled -0.509 0.107 -0.002 29.4 1.058 
 
 
 27
Table 3:  Estimated indexed IBM Score, by experience and ability quintile, 1985-2005. 
Panel A: Regression diagnostics 
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
0.897** 0.578** 0.583** Intercept 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.020) 
0.047** 0.035** 0.026** Experience 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) 
-0.003** -0.004** -0.002** Experience2 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
    
Quintile d.v. No Yes Yes 
Quintile d.v. x Exp. No No Yes 
Quintile d.v. x Exp.2 No No Yes 
    
observations 4564 4564 4564 
R2 0.026 0.555 0.558 
F-statistic (Chow)  1353.96** 3.61** 
* - Significant at 90% confidence level; ** - Significant at 99% confidence level 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Fitted equations and peaks, by quintile 
Quintile Intercept β1 (Exp) β2 (Exp2) Peak Exp Peak iIBM 
1 0.583 0.025 -0.002 5.5 0.653 
2 0.780 0.024 -0.003 4.0 0.827 
3 0.940 0.028 -0.003 4.0 0.995 
4 1.076 0.036 -0.004 4.4 1.153 
5 1.324 0.052 -0.004 5.9 1.475 
Pooled 0.897 0.047 -0.003 8.1 1.086 
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 Table 4:  Average National Basketball Association (NBA) salaries, 1985-2005 
Year 
Arithmetic 
Mean Salary 
($millions) 
Geometric 
Mean Salary 
($millions) 
Arithmetic 
Mean Salary 
for free agents 
($millions) 
Geometric 
Mean Salary 
for free agents 
($millions) 
1985 0.464 0.346 0.590 0.471 
1987 0.571 0.430 0.690 0.557 
1988 0.668 0.512 0.798 0.647 
1990 1.040 0.810 1.237 1.033 
1991 1.250 0.980 1.516 1.281 
1992 1.440 1.112 1.653 1.393 
1993 1.668 1.310 1.925 1.594 
1994 1.882 1.416 2.104 1.677 
1995 2.249 1.661 2.632 2.076 
1996 2.794 1.773 3.367 2.194 
1997 3.041 1.953 3.854 2.594 
1998 3.558 2.378 4.297 3.135 
1999 4.220 2.758 5.214 3.735 
2000 4.620 3.112 5.941 4.447 
2001 4.761 3.089 6.554 4.877 
2002 5.050 3.161 6.976 5.207 
2003 5.087 3.199 7.150 5.345 
2004 5.151 3.337 7.101 5.290 
2005 5.505 3.766 7.588 6.128 
Mean salaries for free agents in the rightmost two columns have been weighted by 
minutes played. 
 
   
 
 29
Table 5:  Estimated adjusted NBA salaries, by experience and talent quintile, 1985-2005. 
 
Panel A.  Regressions 
Coefficient Model 1 
years 1-4 
Model 2 
years 1-4 
Model 3 
years 1-4 
 Model 4 
years 5+ 
Model 5 
years 5+ 
Model 6 
years 5+ 
0.803** 0.674** 0.659** 0.939** 0.771** 0.752** Intercept 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.089) 
-0.003 0.006 0.050 0.029** 0.025** 0.031 Experience 
(0.025) (0.022) (0.039) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) 
0.018** 0.013* -0.002 -0.001** -0.002** -0.002 Experience2 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
0.116** 0.121** 0.129**    Pre95 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.030)    
0.022 0.0120 0.010    Pre95 * Exp 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.049)    
-0.016* -0.013 -0.014    Pre95 * Exp2 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.016)    
       
Quintile dv No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Quintile dv x Exp No No Yes No No Yes 
Quintile dv x Exp2 No No Yes No No Yes 
       
N 1613 1613 1613 2951 2951 2951 
R2 0.133 0.365 0.374 0.048 0.372 0.377 
F-stat (Chow)  36.27** 1.32  125.78** 2.92** 
* - Significant at 90% confidence level; ** - Significant at 99% confidence level.  Regressions included 
d.v. to control for position in all Models.  Regressions included d.v. for position and Pre95 at each quintile 
in Models 2 and 3.  Regressions included d.v. for Exp, Exp2, Pre95 * Exp, and Pre95 * Exp2 at each 
quintile in Model 3. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Fitted equations for years 1-4, by quintile 
Quintile Intercept β1 (Exp) β2 
(Exp2) 
β3 
(Pre95) 
 
β4 
(Pre95*Exp) 
β5 
(Pre95*Exp2) 
ln(iSal) 
year 4 
pre95 
ln(iSal) 
year 4 
post95 
1 0.659 0.050 -0.002 0.129 0.010 -0.014 0.821 0.792 
2 0.717 0.100 -0.012 0.169 -0.078 0.014 0.969 0.909 
3 0.820 -0.040 0.022 0.076 0.047 -0.022 0.921 0.898 
4 0.943 -0.066 0.038 0.053 0.052 -0.027 1.057 1.090 
5 1.083 -0.098 0.046 0.004 0.117 -0.046 1.145 1.204 
Pooled 0.803 -0.003 0.018 0.116 0.022 -0.016 0.990 0.953 
 
Panel C: Fitted equations for years 5 and beyond, by quintile 
Quintile Intercept β1 (Exp) β2 (Exp2) Peak Exp Peak ln(iSal) 
1 0.752 0.031 -0.002 7.2 0.864 
2 0.940 0.018 -0.001 6.9 1.001 
3 0.864 0.048 -0.003 7.1 1.035 
4 0.946 0.037 -0.003 7.2 1.078 
5 1.096 0.025 -0.001 8.4 1.202 
Pooled 0.930 0.029 -0.001 10.5 1.084 
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 Figure 1: Theoretical illustration of observational bias. 
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Figure 2: Estimated indexed IBM Score by age and ability quintile 
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 Age (in years) is on horizontal axis; IBM Score indexed by year and position is on 
vertical axis.  Data points only shown for age-quintile combinations where there are at 
least ten observations.  The corresponding estimated equations are shown in Table 2-A. 
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Figure 3:  Estimated indexed IBM Score, by experience and talent quintile, 1985-2005. 
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Horizontal axis represents years of experience; the vertical axis represents IBM Score 
indexed by year and defensive position.  Data points only shown for experience-quintile 
combinations with at least ten observations.  The corresponding estimated equations are 
shown in Table 3-B. 
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Figure 4:  Estimated adjusted NBA salaries, by experience and talent quintile, 1985-2005. 
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The horizontal axis represents years of experience; the vertical axis represents adjusted 
salary.  For experience levels below 4 years, the adjusted salaries of players who debuted 
before 1995 are indicated with a dashed line, while those of players who debuted after 
1995 are indicated with a solid line.  Estimated data points only shown for experience-
quintile combinations with at least ten observations. 
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Figure 5:  Average ratios of adjusted (NBA) salary over indexed IBM Score, by 
experience and ability quintile, 1985-2005. 
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The horizontal axis measures years of experience; the vertical axis measures the ratio of 
adjusted salary over indexed IBM Score, by quintile and experience level.  For 
experience levels below 4 years, the ratios of players who debuted before 1995 are 
indicated with a dashed line, while those of players who debuted after 1995 are indicated 
with a solid line.  Points only shown for experience-quintile combinations with at least 
ten observations. 
 
